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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Article VII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(4) (1982), and Utah R. App. P. 42.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

The trial court correctly awarded Dr. Osborn summary

judgment since plaintiffs' allegations were not proven by competent
expert testimony.
"Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather
than fact, [the Court of Appeals] review[s] for correctness the
legal conclusions of . . . the trial court." Butterfield v. Okubo,
831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992) (cited cases omitted). See also Themv
v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 529 (Utah 1979) (court
evaluates whether moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law where there is no genuine dispute as to material issues of
fact or where court assumes facts as contended by losing party).
2.

The

trial court's

order

striking the

affidavit of

plaintiffs' proposed emergency room expert was appropriate since
the affidavit attempted to raise matters not properly admissible in
evidence.
"Affidavits of experts are insufficient to defeat summary
judgment unless foundational facts are set forth supporting their
opinions and conclusions."

King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,

832 P.2d 858, 864 n.2 (Utah 1992).

"On review of evidentiary

rulings by the trial court [the Court of Appeals] will not reverse
1

unless it is shown that the trial court has abused its discretion,"
Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432, 436 (Utah App. 1991),
since

"the

trial

court

has

discretion

to

determine

the

admissibility of expert testimony, and to determine if the witness
is qualified to give an opinion on a particular matter." Anton v.
Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991).
3.

Summary judgment was appropriate since the plaintiffs

themselves verified under oath that a cardiologist would need to
speak to the standard of care applicable to Dr. Osborn's treatment
and no testimony from a cardiologist was provided.
This Court should review the trial courts ultimate
conclusion regarding plaintiffs7 admission under a correctness
standard with the underlying factual findings not to be set aside
"unless they are found to be clearly erroneous."

See State v.

Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) (determining correctness
of court's evidentiary treatment of confession).
4.

Since plaintiffs failed to properly controvert the facts

set forth in Dr. Osborn's memorandum in support of his motion for
summary judgment, the trial court correctly concluded that those
facts were deemed admitted and summary judgment for Dr. Osborn was
appropriate as a matter of law.
"[The appellate court] will not interfere with the trial
court's case management unless its actions amount to an abuse of
discretion."

Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande, 830 P.2d 291, 293

(Utah App.) (citation omitted), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (1992).
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5.

This

Court

should

not

consider

plaintiffs' claims

(regarding the Court ordering additional materials in the record)
when plaintiffs did not raise this issue in their docketing
statement on appeal.
Since plaintiffs in part did not mention an issue in
their docketing statement, it was not timely specified on appeal.
Cf. Justheim, 824 P.2d at 437.
6.

Even

if this Court

chooses

to analyze plaintiffs'

argument not raised in their docketing

statement

(concerning

additional information the court ordered placed in the record), the
trial court did not abuse its discretion and the decision was at
worst harmless error.
"On review of evidentiary rulings by the trial court [the
Court of Appeals] will not reverse unless it is shown that the
trial court has abused its discretion." Justheim, 824 P.2d at 436.
Even if the court erred in considering such evidence, such error
was

harmless unless absent the error there is a reasonable

likelihood of a more favorable result for the nonmoving party.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Other than the Utah Supreme Court and appellate court cases
cited in Dr. Osborn's brief, which are controlling in this case,
the Court is referred to Rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration which states:
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains
a concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed
fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and
3

shall specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which the opposing party relies and, if applicable,
shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the
movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set
forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by
an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
specifically controverted by the opposing party's
statement.
(Emphasis added.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Mature of the Case
This is an appeal from the trial court's awarding of summary

judgment

to

Dr. Osborn

on the

grounds

that

(1) plaintiffs

essentially admitted they had no expert to provide testimony
necessary to show that Dr. Osborn committed malpractice; (2) the
affidavit of plaintiffs' proposed expert clearly indicated he is
not an expert in the same area of practice as Dr. Osborn; (3) the
affidavit of plaintiffs' expert lacked foundation, was based on
hearsay and speculation and did not state the evidence as it
appears from the record; (4) plaintiffs' allegations of facts being
extant was not supported by the record; (5) plaintiffs' opposition
memorandum

to summary

judgment did not

set forth a concise

statement of material issues genuinely in issue as required by Rule
4-501(2) (b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration;

(6)

plaintiffs did not provide the Court with a statement of disputed
facts or those facts specifically controverted by admissible
evidence; and (7) the record revealed sufficient admissions to
support the motion for summary judgment.

4

(R. at 287-89.)

B.

Course and Disposition of Proceedings Below
Plaintiffs filed suit against Dr. Osborn and others (including

an emergency room physician, Dr. Dowdall) to recover damages for
what they claimed to be medical malpractice by the defendants
resulting in the death of their son.

Dr. Osborn, a cardiologist

specializing in electrophysiology, filed a motion for summary
judgment claiming that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of
proof of establishing

(1) the standard of care applicable to

Dr. Osborn, (2) breach of that standard of care, and (3) proximate
causation resulting therefrom, all through expert testimony of a
physician sharing Dr. Osborn's specialty.
In response, plaintiffs filed the affidavit of an emergency
room physician (Dr. Bushnell), which affidavit the court concluded
was lacking foundation, based on hearsay and speculation and failed
to state the evidence as it appeared from the record. Accordingly,
the Court granted Dr. Osborn summary judgment.
In granting summary judgment the court ruled that it was
"fully advised in the premises."

Nevertheless, before the final

order and judgment were signed Dr. Osborn requested that the court
order the record to be supplemented so as to clearly indicate that
plaintiffs' own
discovery

"admissions"

(and previously

set

forth

in

their

filed in the record

answers

to

by plaintiffs

themselves) supported the awarding of summary judgment in this
case.

Over plaintiffs' objection the court so ruled.

5

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Preamble
Counsel for Dr. Osborn on appeal is the same counsel that
represented Dr. Osborn below and prepared the papers filed for
matters preceding this brief, including the arguments leading to
summary judgment in this case. Accordingly, rather than quote at
length the full text of the facts and arguments raised below (and
for ease in this Court's review of the same), counsel will for the
most part be paraphrasing or reasserting those arguments in this
brief as if drafted for the first time.
Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts Unsupported by the Record
Dr. Osborn disputes plaintiffs' statement of facts in their
brief to the extent they are entirely unsupported opposed to merely
disputed.

For example, see page 7 of plaintiffs' brief where

plaintiffs claim "Dr. Dowdall, the emergency room physician, would
like to have had Ted Dikeou at another hospital so that he could be
treated directly by Dr. Osborn, his cardiologist."

This statement

is incorrect to the extent that plaintiffs seek to argue that
Dr. Dowdall wanted to move Ted Dikeou to another hospital before he
went into a coma.
this fact

Plaintiffs' citation to the record to support

(R. 190) unequivocally demonstrates that it was Dr.

Dowdall's testimony that only after Ted went into a coma he would
liked to have transferred him to another hospital.
Similarly, although plaintiffs argue that the facts indicate
that "had Dr. Osborn requested, he undoubtedly would have been
granted courtesy privileges [at St. Mark's Hospital] to treat his
6

patient in the emergency situation" since Dr. Osborn later went to
St. Mark's Hospital and "examined Ted, reviewed his medical records
and spent some time reviewing his condition with Mr. and Mrs.
Dikeou," plaintiffs' cited support, R. 235, paragraph 21, is an
affidavit lacking foundation and R. 160 categorically indicates
this was only a social visit. Also, plaintiffs' claim on page 7 of
their brief that Dr. Osborn's decision not to go to St. Mark's
Hospital "was just an excuse and could have been easily overcome"
is not supported by the cite to the record.
1.

On or about March 2, 1992, defendant Dr. Osborn filed a

motion for summary judgment with supporting memorandum in the trial
court below.
2.

(See R. 132-33.)

The uncontroverted

facts set

forth in Dr. Osborn's

memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment were
stated as follows:
1. Dr. Osborn graduated from the University of
Missouri at Kansas City in 1978 with a Bachelor of Arts
Degree in Biology.
Thereafter, he attended medical
school at the University of Missouri at Kansas City and
received his Doctorate of Medicine in 1981.
(See
deposition of Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D. (hereinafter
"Osborn deposition") at p. 4 [attached as Exhibit A to
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Jeffrey S. Osborn,
M.D.'s Motion for Summary Judgment].)
2. Dr. Osborn completed a residency in internal
medicine at St. Luke's Hospital in Kansas City and a
three-year cardiology fellowship at the Mid-America Heart
Institute in Kansas City. (See Osborn deposition at pp.
4-5.)
3. Dr.
medicine and
the American
Physicians,

Osborn is board certified both in internal
cardiovascular diseases and is a member of
College of Cardiology, American College of
North American Society in Pacing and
7

Electrophysiology and the International Society of Heart
Transplantation. (See Osborn deposition at p. 7.)
4.
The above-captioned action is a medical
malpractice case in which plaintiffs allege, in part,
that the defendant, Dr. Osborn, was negligent in his care
and treatment of the decedent.
(See plaintiffs'
Complaint at U 20.)
5. While plaintiffs filed their complaint on or
about Jul^, 1991, and as of the date of [the motion for
summary judgment], they have failed to designate an
expert cardiologist who is qualified and willing to
testify that Dr. Osborn was negligent as alleged by
plaintiffs in this case. (See deposition of James T.
Dikeou (hereinafter "James Dikeou deposition") at pp. 41,
60-62, attached as Exhibit B [to Defendant's Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment]; deposition of
Helen K. Dikeou (hereinafter "Helen Dikeou deposition")
at pp. 36-37, 61, 74-75, 89-92, attached as Exhibit C [to
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment].)
6. In his deposition taken on September 27, 1991,
defendant Dr. Osborn described the decedent, Ted Dikeou,
as having a moderately common condition identified as the
Wolff-Parkinson-White syndrome, which relates to an
abnormal number of electrical conduction systems in the
heart.
Dr. Osborn noted that with medical treatment
patients with this syndrome often may achieve a normal
life expectancy. (See Osborn deposition at
pp. 7-8.)
7. Dr. Osborn testified that on or about February
21, 1990, at 12:30 [a.m.], he had received a call at home
from the decedent, who indicated that he "felt his heart
was fast," which condition the decedent believed may have
been caused by his recently prescribed asthma medicines.
Dr. Osborn suggested that the decedent call him back if
the decedent's condition did not improve. (See Osborn
deposition at p. 17.)
8. Dr. Osborn later received another call from the
decedent informing Dr. Osborn that the decedent wished to
go to the St. Mark's Hospital Emergency Room to have
health care professionals there investigate his
condition. Dr. Osborn informed the decedent that he was
not on the staff of that hospital so he could not attend
the decedent there, but that it was the decedent's choice
whether to go to St. Mark's Hospital.
(See Osborn
deposition at p. 19.)
8

9. Sometime later, Dr. Osborn received a call from
the St. Mark's Hospital Emergency Room physician, codefendant Dr. Michael D. Dowdall, who informed Dr. Osborn
that Ted Dikeou was at the St. Mark's Hospital and was
experiencing a heart rhythm identified as paroxysmal
atrial tachycardia (PAT).
In response to information
received from Dr. Dowdall, Dr. Osborn agreed with
Dr. Dowdall that appropriate treatment for PAT would be
a conservative medical approach with cardioversion being
performed only with an indication of hemodynamic
compromise. (See Osborn deposition at p. 20.)
10. Plaintiffs have, in part, alleged that after
the decedent's
admission
at St. Mark's
Hospital,
defendants St. Mark's Hospital and Michael D. Dowdall,
M.D. "negligently and carelessly treated, prescribed and
administered improper and inappropriate medicines and
treatment" to the decedent, which "in fact sensitized the
decedent and worsened his heart condition causing a
deterioration of heart, rhythm and blood circulation,
damage to his brain and the collapse of regular body
functions." (See plaintiffs' Complaint at H 13.) [Ted
Dikeou died.]
11.
Dr. Osborn was subsequently informed by Dr.
John Perry, a cardiologist on staff at St. Mark's
Hospital, that when Dr. Perry arrived at the hospital to
assist with the decedent's care, he had learned that the
decedent had been experiencing atrial fibrillation of his
heart and not PAT. (See Osborn deposition at p. 32.)
12. Dr. Osborn testified that if Dr. Dowdall had
originally
informed
him
that
the
decedent
was
experiencing atrial fibrillation and not PAT, Dr.
Osborn's response to Dr. Dowdall regarding appropriate
treatment would have been different than that rendered
the patient by Dr. Dowdall. Dr. Osborn also noted that
he could not have provided medical treatment to the
decedent at St. Mark's Hospital inasmuch as he did not
have staff privileges at that facility.
(See Osborn
deposition at p. 79.)
13.
Plaintiff Helen K. Dikeou testified in her
deposition that on the night in question she had traveled
to St. Mark's Hospital with her son and while there had
repeatedly asked Dr. Dowdall to call Dr. Osborn about her
son's condition. (See Helen Dikeou deposition at p. 71.)
14. Helen Dikeou noted that prior to Dr. Dowdall
calling Dr. Osborn, Dr. Dowdall had injected her son with
medication (see Helen Dikeou deposition at pp. 30-31) and
9

that when she herself finally called Dr. Osborn by
telephone from St. Mark's Hospital, he stated that he had
spoken to Dr. Dowdall and was himself waiting to hear
back from Dr. Dowdall or St. Mark's Hospital about the
decedent's condition (see Helen Dikeou deposition at
p. 34).
15.
Helen Dikeou testified that no medically
trained professionals had been specifically critical of
Dr. Osborn's care of the decedent, although (a) a nurse
had been critical about how long it took St. Mark's
Hospital personnel to revive the decedent once they
undertook treatment (see Helen Dikeou deposition at pp.
36-37); (b) anonymous doctors had summarily informed her
friends that she should "pursue" this matter (see Helen
Dikeou deposition at p. 39); (c) she had had the
impression that Dr. Osborn felt that "things weren't
right" (see Helen Dikeou deposition at p. 40); (d) a
neurologist not giving a medical opinion had casually
stated that "it sounded like something was amiss" (see
Helen Dikeou deposition at p. 42); and (e) other
physicians who were not cardiologists, had, likewise,
casually so opined (see Helen Dikeou deposition at p. 4243).
16. Helen Dikeou also stated that she knows of no
instance where Dr. Dowdall expressly criticized Dr.
Osborn's care (see Helen Dikeou deposition at p. 61) and
stated that none of the other doctors at the hospital
were critical about the care rendered to her son (see
Helen Dikeou deposition at pp. 74-75), but that her
attorney had originally suggested that plaintiffs include
Dr. Osborn in this suit (see Helen Dikeou deposition at
pp. 75-76) .
17. Helen Dikeou noted that no one had ever told
her that [the decedent] was treated at St. Mark's
Hospital in accordance with the instructions supplied by
Dr. Osborn and that she knows of no medical records
referencing the same. She also stated that she knows of
no one who has alleged that Dr. Osborn was negligent in
failing to properly ascertain the condition of her son
and that she, in her own words, instead "understood . .
. that based on what information was given to [Dr.
Osborn], I'm sure he acted accordingly. He wasn't there
to see the records or the heart strip or anything like
that. So all he was acting on was information that was
given to him." (See Helen Dikeou deposition at pp. 8991.)
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18. Importantly, Helen Dikeou testified that she
had been aware prior to taking her son to St. Mark's
Hospital in February, 1990, that Dr. Osborn did not
practice and did not have privileges at St. Mark's
Hospital and, accordingly, could not come to St. Mark's
Hospital and attend to her son on the evening her son
chose to be admitted there. (See Helen Dikeou deposition
at pp. 92-93.)
19. Helen Dikeou also testified that, although in
her Complaint she had alleged that Dr. Osborn should have
examined her son, she knew that Dr. Osborn could not do
so at St. Mark's Hospital where the decedent himself had
chosen to be admitted (see Helen Dikeou deposition at pp.
93-94) and no one has ever told her that Dr. Osborn
failed to properly respond to her son's condition after
he went to St. Mark's Hospital (see Helen Dikeou
deposition at p. 96).
20.
Plaintiff James T. Dikeou, the decedent's
father, testified on November 7, 1991, that Dr. Perry had
never expressed dismay or any concern about how Ted
Dikeou had been treated medically.
(See James Dikeou
deposition at p. 41.)
21. James Dikeou also testified that no one has
ever told him that Dr. Osborn failed to examine or
diagnose the decedent or that Dr. Osborn misprescribed
medication for the decedent or failed to respond to
conditions the decedent developed at St. Mark's Hospital.
(See James Dikeou deposition at p. 60.)
22. James Dikeou reiterated that he had no facts
upon which to base any allegations of wrongdoing on the
part of Dr. Osborn. (See James Dikeou deposition at pp.
61-62.)
23. Co-defendant Dr. Michael D. Dowdall admitted in
his deposition on September 27, 1991, that he had told
Dr. Osborn that if the decedent needed to be treated with
electrical shock and if the treatment did not work, he
would let Dr. Osborn know.
(See deposition of Dr.
Michael D. Dowdall (hereinafter "Dowdall deposition") at
p. 48, attached as Exhibit D [to Defendant's Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment].)
24.
Dr. Dowdall also testified that he later
decided not to call Dr. Osborn back; and Dr. Dowdall
conceded that there was a cardiologist on call at St.
Mark's Hospital on the night the decedent admitted
himself there. (See Dowdall deposition at pp. 53-54.)
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25. Dr. Dowdall noted that only after the decedent
experienced cardiac arrest, Dr. Dowdall considered
transferring the decedent to a hospital where Dr. Osborn
had privileges. (See Dowdall deposition at p. 61.) And
Dr. Dowdall also stated that he had felt competent to
undertake the treatment of the decedent and, at no time,
felt overwhelmed or overpowered or that the treatment
required was beyond his abilities.
(See Dowdall
deposition at p. 71.)
26.
Dr. Dowdall admitted that he knew that Dr.
Osborn was not on the staff at St. Mark's Hospital. (See
Dowdall deposition at p. 74.)
27. Dr. John Joseph Perry, the staff cardiologist
at St. Mark's Hospital who also treated the decedent
after the decedent had admitted himself there, testified
during his deposition that he is a board certified
cardiologist on staff at St. Mark's Hospital.
(See
deposition of Dr. John Joseph Perry (hereinafter "Perry
deposition") at pp. 4-6, attached as Exhibit E to
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment.)
28. Dr. Perry testified that Dr. Osborn does not
practice at St. Mark's Hospital and does not have staff
privileges there. (See Perry deposition at pp. 12, 16.)
29.
Dr. Perry testified that in his opinion the
electrical conversions performed at St. Mark's Hospital
by Dr. Dowdall had not been effective since they involved
"inadequate voltage or power." (See Perry deposition at
p. 35.)
30.
Dr. Perry also noted that the heart monitor
strips he had reviewed when caring for the decedent at
St. Mark's Hospital had revealed atrial fibrillation and
not a PAT condition even though it was his impression
that
Dr. Dowdall
had
described
the patient
as
experiencing PAT (see Perry deposition at pp. 46, 59-60) .
31. Dr. Perry also noted that the medication the
decedent had received at St. Mark's Hospital would have
been appropriate if the [decedent] had been experiencing
PAT arrhythmia at the time that Dr. Osborn had been so
informed. (See Perry deposition at pp. 60-62.)
32. All the testimony in this case evidences that
Dr. Osborn was not negligent in his treatment of [the
decedent] and that any medical care and treatment
rendered by Dr. Osborn to the decedent complied in all
12

respects with the standards of professional care,
learning, skill and treatment ordinarily possessed and
used by cardiologists in good standing in this and
similar communities on or about February, 1990, which
fact is not contested by expert testimony or the
documentation or records involved in this case. (See
Exhibits A-E [to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment].)
(See R. 137-46 and deposition pages attached thereto at R. 152203.)
3.
centered

The basis for Dr. Osborn's motion for summary judgment
upon

"plaintiffs'

failure

to

prove

their

case

of

negligence against Dr. Osborn by not producing an expert able to
establish a breach of the [applicable] standard of care by Dr.
Osborn and that the alleged breach of the standard of care by Dr.
Osborn was the proximate cause of the injuries plaintiffs allege."
(R. 136-37.)
4.

As a courtesy to plaintiffs' attorneys, Dr. Osborn's

counsel agreed that plaintiffs need not file their opposition
memorandum to summary judgment with affidavits plaintiffs believed
necessary to controvert the same until after plaintiffs7 counsel
"complete[d their] preparation for designation of witnesses." (See
R. at 214.)
5.

On March 18, 1992, plaintiffs filed their designation of

witnesses with the court and as experts claimed they would in part
offer:
11. Michael
D. Lesh, M.D., University
of
California, San Francisco, [address] . . . a licensed
cardiologist, will testify regarding the standard of
medical care, the deviation from that standard of care by
Dr. Michael D. Dowdall and Dr. Jeffrey S. Osborn in their
diagnosis and treatment of Theodore James Dikeou, the
13

effects of their treatment on Ted Dikeou's
cardiac arrhythmia, and the cause and effect
ships between their respective actions and
which ultimately resulted in the death of Ted

heart and
relationtreatment
Dikeou.

12. Fred Bushnell, M.D.f [address and phone number]
a duly licensed emergency room physician, will testify
regarding the standard of medical care for an emergency
room physician and for the treatment of patients such as
the plaintiffs' son, the departure from that standard of
care by Michael D. Dowdall, M.D. [an emergency room
physician] and Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D., and the direct
relationship between that departure from the acceptable
standards of medical care to the subsequent death of
Theodore James Dikeou.
(R. 221-22 (emphasis added).)
6.

On or about March 30, 1992, plaintiffs filed their

opposition memorandum to Dr. Osborn's motion for summary judgment;
and in doing so plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of an emergency
room physician, Dr. J. Fred Bushnell, in an apparent attempt to
comply with this Court's case law that a competent

expert's

testimony must be presented to establish a breach of the applicable
standard of care on behalf of a health care professional.

(See R.

225-37.) Bushnell's affidavit was in part offered to establish the
standard

of

specializing

care

applicable

to

Dr.

Osborn

(a

cardiologist

in electrophysiology) even though plaintiffs had

already designated Dr. Bushnell as "testify[ing] regarding the
standard

of

medical

care

for

an

emergency

room

physician."

(R. 222.)
7.

Importantly, as another part of plaintiffs' opposition to

defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs submitted to
the Court their answers to Dr. Osborn's interrogatories which had
been prepared on March 9, 1992.
14

Included was a response to

defendant's

interrogatory

seeking

a

basis

for

plaintiffs'

allegations against Dr. Osborn where plaintiffs themselves verified
under oath that:

"Plaintiff believes that this Interrogatory is

best answered by a medical expert in the field of cardiology, and
in response, attaches a copy of a letter opinion from Michael D.
Lesh, M.D., a cardiologist contacted by Plaintiff's attorneys to
evaluate the care given to Theodore "Ted" Dikeou, Tandl which
opinion will be supplemented hereafter."

(See R. 246 (emphasis

added)•)
8.

Plaintiffs' own cardiology expert was not critical of Dr.

Osborn's treatment and care of the plaintiff and did not claim that
such treatment and care, opposed to the treatment and care rendered
by other health care providers and one-time defendants, led to
plaintiff's death.
9.

(See R. 312-13.)

On April 3, 1992, Dr. Osborn filed a motion to strike the

affidavit

of plaintiffs' emergency

Bushnell.

(R. 252-64.)

10.

room expert, Dr. J. Fred

A notice to submit for decision Dr. Osborn's motion for

summary judgment was filed on or about April 3, 1992. (See R. 26566.)
11.

On or about April

opposition

memorandum

to

16, 1992, plaintiffs filed their

Dr. Osborn's

affidavit of Dr. Bushnell.

(R. 273-83.)

motion

to

strike

the

Plaintiffs essentially

claimed therein that "Utah case law does not require that an expert
witness

be

professional

trained

in

malpractice

the

same

field

litigation"
15

(R.

as

the

275)

defendant
and

that

in
Dr.

Bushnell's

affidavit

should

be

considered

by

the

court

notwithstanding Dr. Osborn's claims that it was inadmissible.

(R.

279-81.)
12.
opposition

On April 17, 1992, after plaintiffs had filed their
memorandum

to

Dr. Osborn's

motion

to

strike

the

affidavit of Dr. Bushnell, the Court, Judge Richard H. Moffat
presiding, ruled in a minute entry as follows:
The Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant
Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D. is hereby granted. The Court is
of the opinion for the reasons, inter alia, set forth in
the Memorandum in Support of said Motion and the Joint
Reply Memorandum in Support thereof that the plaintiffs
have, by the record, patently admitted that they have no
expert to provide testimony necessary to show that Dr.
Osborn's involvement in the treatment of the decedent
(there being no actual treatment by Dr. Osborn on the
night that the damage to the decedent's heart occurred)
did not rise to the standard required under Utah Law. In
an attempt to satisfy this short coming after the filing
of the Motion the plaintiffs filed the affidavit of J.
Fred Bushnell, M.D. An examination of that affidavit
clearly indicates that Dr. Bushnell is not an expert in
the same area of practice as Dr. Osborn. Further an
examination of his opinion clearly reveals a lack of
foundation and is also clearly based on hearsay. Even
given a presumption of the ability to rely on hearsay to
an expert's testimony said affidavit does not meet the
criteria required to enable him to be able to testify as
to the standard of the care required for a physician
specializing in the same specialty as Dr. Osborn.
Another deficiency of Dr. Bushnell's affidavit is that as
to most of the content of paragraphs 11 through 23 the
statements are based on speculation and further do not
state the evidence as it appears from the record.
Therefore, the Motion to Strike Dr. Bushnell's Affidavit
is therefore granted. In addition, it should be noted
that the claim of allegations of fact being extant simply
is not supported by the record. The memorandum of the
[plaintiffs] does not set forth the concise statement of
the material issues of fact that are genuinely in issue
as required by Rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.
Further there is not a
statement of each disputed fact as required in a separate
numbered sentence nor are any of the facts specifically
16

converted by admissible evidence and in fact the record
reveals admission sufficient to support the Motion for
Summary Judgment.
(See 287-89.)
13.

On or about May 8, 1992, Dr. Osborn filed a motion for

filing of discovery
exhibits.

responses with

supporting memorandum and

Therein, Dr. Osborn moved the Court to order that

plaintiffs' answers to Dr. Osborn's interrogatories and answers to
defendant St. Marks Hospital's first set of interrogatories be
filed as part of the record in this case.

(See R. 297-302.)

Importantly, this motion was redundant insofar as plaintiffs'
answers

to Dr. Osborn's

interrogatories

were

involved

since

plaintiffs themselves had already filed interrogatory answers with
the Court as an exhibit to their memorandum in opposition to Dr.
Osborn's motion for summary judgment.
14.

(See R. 246.)

In defendant's motion for filing discovery responses, Dr.

Osborn suggested that the Court should make plaintiffs' answers to
interrogatories

a part

of

the

record

since

plaintiffs' own

admissions under oath (concerning the fact that only a cardiologist
could

best

testify

as to

allegations

involving

Dr. Osborn)

represent and support "the correctness of the Court's March 17,
1992 rulings on Dr. Osborn's motion for summary judgment and motion
to strike the affidavit of plaintiffs' emergency room expert."
(See R. 299-301.)

Dr. Osborn also submitted correspondence to the

trial court, which correspondence (filed May 5, 1992) advised the
Court

as

to

the

proposed

summary

judgment

and

order which

Dr. Osborn's counsel had been instructed to prepare and the nature
17

of the motion to supplement the record with discovery responses.
Further, that letter stated that "if the Court wishes to postpone
entry of the [order to supplement the record] until plaintiffs have
an opportunity to object to the motion, we will be pleased to
respond to any objection.

We will also gladly address any

questions or concerns the Court may have."

(See R. 295-96.)

A

copy of this letter was sent to all counsel.
15.

As

ordered,

Dr. Osborn

also

submitted

his

summary

judgment and order on May 4, 1992, which the Court signed on May 8,
1992

(R.

340-42),

together

with

the

order

authorizing

supplementation of the record to include plaintiffs' answers to
interrogatories.

(R. 338-39.)

Fourteen days after the Court

entered its summary judgment in this matter and its order allowing
for supplementation of the record and twenty-one days after being
hand-served with Dr. Osborn's motion to file discovery responses,
plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion
for filing of discovery responses.

(R. 346-49.)

In doing so,

plaintiffs ignored the fact that as part of their opposition to the
motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs themselves had already
filed in the record some of the same answers (R. 246) to Dr.
Osborn's interrogatories that plaintiffs claimed the court should
not have ordered filed to complete the record.
16.

(See R. 346-48.)

Dr. Osborn filed a reply to plaintiffs' opposition to the

filing of discovery responses.

Therein Dr. Osborn noted that

"plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion for
filing of discovery responses is moot since it was filed after the
18

Court granted defendant's motion" and that plaintiffs7 claims were
likewise without merit since the trial court had discretion to
supplement

the

record with any

presented by the parties.
17.
appeal

sworn matters that

had been

(See R. 351-54.)

On October 13, 1992, plaintiffs filed their notice of

in this case

(R. 363-64) and thereafter

docketing statement on or about November 6, 1992.

submitted a
Importantly,

therein plaintiffs did not raise any claim that the trial court
improperly supplemented the record with plaintiffs7 answers to
interrogatories.

(Appellate record.)
ARGUMENT
Point I

The Trial Court Correctly Awarded Dr. Osborn
Summary Judgment Since Plaintiffs7 Allegations
Were Not Proven by Competent Expert Testimony
In

filing

their

action

essentially alleged that

against

Dr.

Osborn

plaintiffs

(1) Dr. Osborn should have performed

further testing, investigation and treatment of Ted Dikeou, (2) Dr.
Osborn should have been aware that an emergency room physician, Dr.
Dowdall, missed the diagnosis of Ted Dikeou's heart rhythm, (3) Dr.
Osborn should have been aware that Dr. Dowdall's misdiagnosis would
result in mismedication, (4) as a cardiologist Dr. Osborn should
appreciate the seriousness of the occurrences of which Ted Dikeou
complained and should have further investigated the same at a
hospital

where

he

was

lacking

staff

privileges,

(5)

as

a

cardiologist Dr. Osborn should have known that the aspects of Ted
Dikeou's medical problem were inconsistent with Dr. Dowdall's
19

evaluation, and (6) as a cardiologist Dr. Osborn should have done
something different to confirm the condition for which medication
was offered by an emergency room physician.

(R. at 5, 233-36, 245-

47.)
In awarding Dr. Osborn summary judgment in this case, Judge
Moffat ruled:
The Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant
Jeffrey S. Osborn, M.D. is hereby granted. The Court is
of the opinion for the reasons, inter alia, set forth in
the Memorandum in Support of said Motion and the Joint
Reply Memorandum in Support thereof that the plaintiffs
have, by the record, patently admitted that they have no
expert to provide testimony necessary to show that Dr.
Osborn's involvement in the treatment of the decedent
(there being no actual treatment by Dr. Osborn on the
night that the damage to the decedents heart occurred)
did not rise to the standard required under Utah Law. In
an attempt to satisfy this short coming after the filing
of the Motion the plaintiffs filed the affidavit of J.
Fred Bushnell, M.D. An examination of that affidavit
clearly indicates that Dr. Bushnell is not an expert in
the same area of practice as Dr. Osborn. Further an
examination of his opinion clearly reveals a lack of
foundation and is also clearly based on hearsay. Even
given a presumption of the ability to rely on hearsay to
an experts testimony said affidavit does not meet the
criteria required to enable him to be able to testify as
to the standard of the care required for a physician
specializing in the same specialty as Dr. Osborn.
Another deficiency of Dr. Bushnell's affidavit is that as
to most of the content of paragraphs 11 through 23 the
statements are based on speculation and further do not
state the evidence as it appears from the record.
Therefore, the Motion to Strike Dr. Bushnell's Affidavit
is therefore granted. In addition, it should be noted
that the claim of allegations of fact being extant simply
is not supported by the record. The memorandum of the
[plaintiffs] does not set forth the concise statement of
the material issues of fact that are genuinely in issue
as required by Rule 4-501(2) (b) of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.
Further there is not a
statement of each disputed fact as required in a separate
numbered sentence nor are any of the facts specifically
converted by admissible evidence and in fact the record

20

reveals admission sufficient to support the Motion for
Summary Judgment.
As this Court stated in Olson v. Park Craig Olson, Inc., 815
P.2d 1356, 1358 (Utah App. 1991), "summary judgment is appropriate
'only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'

In our review

of whether summary judgment was properly granted, we examine the
facts in the light most favorable to the losing party.

'[W]e

review the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and give
no particular deference to that court's view of the law.7"

(Cited

and quoted cases omitted.)
Similarly, when "summary judgment is granted as a matter of
law rather than fact [as is the case here where the trial court
applied Rule 4-501 and where there are undisputed facts], [the
appellate court] review[s] for correctness or legal conclusions of
. . . the trial court."

See Okubo, 831 P.2d at 102. Accord Themy

v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 529 (Utah 1979).

And

to the extent this Court's review of the trial court's conclusions
for summary judgment is based upon a review of evidentiary rulings
by the court (i.e., whether plaintiffs' allegations were proven by
competent expert testimony), this Court should not reverse the same
"unless

it

is

shown

that

the

trial

court

has

abused

its

discretion," Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d at 436, since
"the major purpose of summary judgment is 'to avoid unnecessary
trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine
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whether there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder.'"
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, 832 P.2d 858, 864 n.2 (Utah 1992).
Applying these cases to the matter at hand demonstrates that
summary judgment was appropriately granted in this case since
plaintiff failed to establish by competent and credible evidence
that Dr. Osborn breached the standard of care proximately causing
plaintiffs' claimed injuries.
As argued to the trial court below, the well-established and
undisputable rule of law dictates that in order to sustain a
medical malpractice case plaintiffs must establish
(1) The standard of care by which the doctor's conduct
is to be measuredf
(2)

Breach of that standard by the doctor, and

(3) Injury
negligence.

proximately

caused

by

the

doctor's

Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah App. 1988) (citing
Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah
1981)) . Importantly, expert testimony in medical malpractice cases
is limited to that which is within the doctor's specific field of
practice.

See Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 822.

Relying on these principles of law, Dr. Osborn claimed below
that he was entitled to summary judgment since plaintiffs had
failed to meet their burden of proof in this case by not offering
competent

credible

specializing

testimony

of

in electrophysiology

a

qualified

cardiologist

(Dr. Osborn's specialty and

practice) to establish plaintiffs' claim that Dr. Osborn breached
the applicable standard of care. In response, plaintiffs presented
22

the affidavit of an emergency room physician, Dr. J. Fred Bushnell,
to purportedly speak to this standard of care.
As argued below and in connection with the rule of law
establishing plaintiffs' burden of proof and Dr. Osborn's motion to
strike the affidavit offered by plaintiffs' emergency room expert,
the Utah Supreme Court has previously ruled that even an ocular
plastic surgeon cannot testify competently in a medical malpractice
action against a general plastic surgeon who performed eyelid
surgery when there is no foundation to establish that any general
plastic surgeon performing the procedure would employ the same
methods and follow the same procedures as those the ocular plastic
surgeon might purport to describe.

See Burton v. Younqblood, 711

P.2d 245, 249 (Utah 1985).
Indeed,

in

Burton

the

Court

ruled

that

"ordinarily,

a

practitioner of one school of medicine is not competent to testify
as an expert in a malpractice action against a practitioner of
another school."

See 711 P.2d at 248.

In order for the Court to

apply any exception to this rule plaintiffs in this case were
required to first lay sufficient foundation to show that the method
of treatment, and hence the standard of care, is identical to both
a

physician

skilled

in

cardiovascular

diseases

and

electrophysiology (Dr. Osborn's practice) and a physician skilled
in emergency room medicine (the specialty of plaintiffs' expert).
This plaintiffs could not do through the mere presentation of the
testimony of an expert emergency room physician not skilled in the
specifics of cardiovascular diseases and electrophysiology.
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In

fact, the Utah Supreme Court in Burton found no error with the
trial court's decision therein (that a physician in one specialty
was incapable of testifying as to the standard of care of a
physician in another specialty) when the expert based his opinion
merely upon his personal training and experience and was unable to
show that any physician schooled in the medical specialty practiced
by the defendant physician would employ the expert's methods and
follow the expert's procedures.

Id.

Moreover, as the Burton court recognized, cases in other
jurisdictions follow this holding.

Indeed, in Caro v. Bumpus, 491

P.2d 606 (Colo. App. 1970), cited with approval in Burton, that
court ruled:
Courts require proof by competent evidence that the
methods of treatment are the same for the defendant's
school of medicine and the expert witness's school of
medicine.
Id. at 608.

Therein, the court held that because the proposed

expert was not of the same school as the defendant the proposed
expert could not himself provide this required testimony. In fact,
the court noted that competent

evidence that the methods of

treatment are the same for the two schools of medicine could not be
provided except (1) by the defendant himself; (2) by a witness who
was

an

expert

practitioner

of

in

both

schools;

defendant's

own

(3) or
school.

by

testimony

Certainly

no

of

a

such

testimony was provided here and thus the trial court could have
correctly ruled that there was no competent evidence that the
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methods of treatment

for an emergency

room physician

and a

cardiologist specializing in electrophysiology are the same.
Likewise, in Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. App. 1978) ,
also cited with approval in Burton, that court ruled:

"The mere

fact that two specialties may treat the same symptoms or perform
the same operations does not imply that a physician's conduct will
no longer be tested by the standards of his own school or his own
specialty."

Id. at 347-48 (citations omitted).

See also Prosser

163, ch. 5, § 32 (4th ed.) ("The courts have been compelled to
recognize that there are areas in which even experts will disagree.
Where there are different schools of medical thought, it is held
that the dispute cannot be settled by the law, and the doctor is
entitled to be judged according to the tenets of the school he
professes to follow."

(Footnote omitted.)).

And, most recently in Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 (Utah
1993), our Supreme Court again reiterated that an exception to the
rule that a practitioner in one specialty is not ordinarily
competent

to testify

as an expert

on the

standard

of care

applicable in another specialty is only made "when a witness is
knowledgeable about the standard of care of another specialty or
when the standards of different specialties on the issue in a
particular case are the same."

Id. at 1310.

Applying these cases to the facts at hand demonstrates the
propriety of the court's awarding Dr. Osborn summary judgment in
this case.
physician

Indeed, the affidavit of plaintiffs7 emergency room
that plaintiffs

sought to offer to oppose
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summary

judgment in this case in favor of the cardiologist specializing in
electrophysiology (Dr. Osborn) fails to establish the following
requirements established by the above case law:

(1) that a

cardiologist specializing in electrophysiology would employ the
same methods and follow the same procedures as those plaintiffs'
emergency room physician purported to describe (Burton. 711 P.2d at
249); (2) that the method of treatment and hence the standard of
care is identical to both a physician skilled in cardiovascular
diseases and electrophysiology and a physician skilled in emergency
room medicine (id.); (3) that the emergency room physician can
testify as to cardiology when there is a board certification and
recognized medical specialty of cardiology (State v. Warden. 784
P.2d 1204 (Utah 1989), rev'd, 813 P.2d 1146 (1991)); (4) that the
emergency room physician was an expert in not only emergency room
medicine but also cardiology and electrophysiology fCaro v. Bumpus,
492 P.2d 606 (cited in Burton. supra)); and (5) that plaintiffs'
emergency room physician expert was even knowledgeable about the
standard of care applicable to a cardiologist specializing in
electrophysiology and could testify that that standard of care was
identical to that which may be followed by an emergency room
physician.

(Arnold, 846 at 1310.)

In fact, the affidavit of

plaintiffs' emergency room physician never even demonstrated that
that physician was aware of the appropriate methods, procedures of
diagnosing,

treatment

and

investigation

which

cardiologists would employ in similar circumstances*
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reasonable

Instead, the affidavit of plaintiffs' emergency room physician
expert sought to establish the standard of care applicable to
cardiologist/electrophysiologist Dr. Osborn merely by claiming:
(1) "I am specialty qualified in emergency medicine.

I am also

board eligible in quality assurance and utilization review"; (2)
having read and studied medical records and transcripts of the
depositions

"I have formed a professional opinion as to the

standard of medical care applicable in this case and whether Drs.
Osborn and Dowdall [emergency room physician defendant who settled
out of this case] adhered to that standard of care in their
treatment of Ted Dikeou"; and (3) "Dr. Osborn was aware of the
unique nature of [the occurrence of plaintiff's complaints of a
rapid heart rate] and by his own testimony noted that this
prolonged episode warranted further testing, investigation and
treatment of Ted Dikeou's prolonged tachycardia—a presentation
made gravely ominous by Ted's known diagnosis of Wolff-ParkinsonWhite syndrome. This is the standard of medical care which applies
to Dr. Jeffrey Osborn."
233-34.)

These

requirements.

(See affidavit at paras. 7, 10, 13 at R.

claims

are

sorely

inadequate

to

meet

the

Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate in

this case since plaintiffs were unable to comply with their burden
of proof.
As an aside, under the Supreme Court's recent ruling in
Arnold, this Court can also correctly conclude that the trial court
appropriately granted summary judgment in this case since the
affidavit

of

plaintiffs'

emergency
27

room

expert

does

not

sufficiently establish that Dr. Osborn's alleged breach of the
standard of care proximately caused plaintiffs' claimed injuries.
Indeed, in this case plaintiffs claim that they incurred damages
due

to

the

cardiac

arrest,

coma

and

death

of

their

son.

Nevertheless, in his affidavit plaintiffs' expert only states
insofar as the element of "causation" and Dr. Osborn are concerned
that Dr. Osborn's suggestion of the administration of medication
played "a major role in the exacerbation of Ted's condition and his
subsequent cardiac arrest, coma and death."

(See R. 235 at 1F 19.)

Since the affidavit does not explicitly draw the required proximate
causal link between Dr. Osborn's actions or alleged failures to act
and the death of Ted Dikeou, the trial court could correctly grant
Dr. Osborn summary judgment in this case.1

See Arnold, 846 P.2d

at 1310-11.
In sum, since the testimony purportedly offered by plaintiffs'
emergency room expert was not competent or credible to address the
standard

of

care

required

of

a

physician

specializing

in

cardiovascular diseases and electrophysiology as is Dr. Osborn,

Similarly, as set forth in Point III, infra, the trial court
could correctly grant summary judgment in this case based solely
upon the fact that plaintiffs themselves admitted under oath and
filed a statement in the record claiming that plaintiffs believed
that the substance of the allegations against Dr. Osborn were "best
answered by a medical expert in the field of cardiology, and in
response [attached] a copy of a letter opinion from Michael D.
Lesh, M.D., a cardiologist contacted by plaintiffs' attorney." (R.
246.) And Dr. Lesh's letter provided to the court fails in any
regard to demonstrate any causal link between Dr. Osborn's
treatment and care of Ted Dikeou and his ultimate coma and death.
(See R. 312-13.)
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plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof as required under
Utah law and the trial court correctly granted Dr. Osborn's motion
for summary judgment.
Point II
The Trial Court/s Order Striking the Affidavit
of Plaintiffs' Proposed Emergency Room Expert
Was Appropriate Since the Affidavit Attempted
to Raise Matters Not Properly Admissible in Evidence
As stated by the Supreme Court in Anton v. Thomas. 806 P.2d
744 (Utah App. 1991), "the trial court has discretion to determine
the admissibility of expert testimony, and to determine if the
witness is qualified to give an opinion on a particular matter.
Such a ruling will not be reversed unless the trial court abused
its discretion in excluding the expert testimony and, even then,
only if the appellant can show

'the excluded evidence would

probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict."
Admission of expert testimony requires proper foundation to
qualify the witness.

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure requires that affidavits be made on personal knowledge
and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence or show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to matters
stated in those affidavits. As the Utah Supreme Court has ruled:
"An affidavit that does not measure up to the
standards of [Rule] 56(e) is subject to a motion to
strike; and formal defects are waived in the absence of
such a motion or other objection." This is particularly
true where the opposing affidavit of the plaintiff is
self-serving and the testimony thereinf if given at
trial, could be disbelieved by the jury.
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Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352, 353-54 (Utah 1972)
(footnote and citation omitted).

Further, an affidavit which

merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated conclusion and which
fails to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to create an issue
of fact. Wallier v. Pope, 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973). And this
Court

in

King

v.

Searle

Pharmaceuticals,

Inc.,

noted

that

"affidavits of experts are insufficient to defeat summary judgment
unless foundational facts are set forth supporting their opinions
and conclusions."

832 P.2d at 864 n.2 (citing Butterfield v.

Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah 1992)); accord Walker v. Rocky
Mountain Recreational Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973) (summary
judgment

appropriate

since

opposing

affidavit

revealed

no

evidentiary facts and only reflected affiant's unsubstantiated
opinions and conclusions).
Here, the trial court considered the affidavit of plaintiffs'
expert and ruled that (1) it failed to demonstrate that the affiant
was competent and capable to testify as to the standard of care
required of a cardiologist specializing in electrophysiology such
as Dr. Osborn in this case; (2) the affidavit lacked foundation,
(3) it was based on hearsay, (4) it did not demonstrate the same
criteria exist

for cardiologists and emergency

room medicine

physicians, (5) it was based on speculation, and (6) it did not
accurately state the evidence from the record.
A plain reading

of the affidavit

(See R. 287-89.)

of plaintiffs' expert

Dr. Bushnell offered in opposition to Dr. Osborn's motion for
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summary judgment clearly demonstrates the appropriateness of the
trial court's rule striking the same.
For example, paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 23 and
each paragraph referencing the standard of care applicable to Dr.
Osborn are inadmissible

since there is no foundation and no

competent and credible evidence offered demonstrating that Dr.
Bushnell is even aware of much less capable to testify as to the
standard

of

care

required

of

a

physician

cardiovascular diseases and electrophysiology.

specializing

in

(See Point I,

supra.)
Second, as the court noted paragraphs 11 through 23 of Dr.
Bushnell's affidavit were appropriately stricken since (a) they are
based on speculation, (b) they are vague and overbroad, (c) they
misstate the undisputed evidence, and (d) they lack foundation as
to the matters they purport to address.2
2

Also, allegations set

See for example paragraph 11 involving speculation, lacking
foundation and based upon unsubstantiated opinion regarding whether
Dr. Osborn was the physician best informed of plaintiff's
condition, health and medical information, paragraph 12 referencing
hearsay, paragraph 13 involving speculation regarding whether Dr.
Osborn was or was not aware of certain information, paragraph 12
which misstates the facts before the court to the extent it
impliedly represents that the decedent was not receiving further
testing, investigation and treatment (cf» R. 158 regarding fact
that plaintiff was obtaining further testing, investigation and
treatment), paragraph 14 offering speculation as to what Dr. Osborn
was made aware, paragraph 15 offering speculation as to what
Dr. Osborn failed to appreciate, paragraph 15 misstating the facts
as to Dr. Osborn failing to investigate his patient's symptoms (cf.
R. 158), paragraph 17 based on speculation and hearsay as to why
Dr. Dowdall called Dr. Osborn, paragraph 18 offering speculation as
to what Dr. Osborn knew and should have known and exhibiting no
foundation as to whether Dr. Osborn could have requested the
decedent be transferred or another physician called in, paragraph
19 based on hearsay, paragraph 20 lacking foundation, and paragraph
21 lacking foundation and based on hearsay. (R. 232-36.)
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forth in those paragraphs are conclusionary and improperly seek to
address legal theories.

(See, e.g., paragraph 23 purporting to

address the ultimate legal conclusion of negligence.

(R. at 236.))

Based upon the foregoing case law and a plain review of Dr.
Bushnell's affidavit, the trial court appropriately ordered the
affidavit stricken and this Court should affirm its ruling on
appeal•
A.

Plaintiffs offered no support to the trial court for their
allegations concerning the applicable standard of care: and
case law and treatise support plaintiffs proposed below
categorically demonstrated that the affidavit of plaintiffs*
expert was appropriately stricken»
Importantly, as set forth for the Court below, in their

opposition memorandum to Dr. Osborn's motion to strike plaintiffs
essentially argued that their expert emergency room physician could
testify

as

to

the

standard

of medical

care

cardiologist specializing in electrophysiology.

required

of a

Instead of having

their emergency room expert lay the foundation therefor, however,
plaintiffs merely offered the unsupported claims that
1.

"All physicians undergo the same basic medical training,
and the basic duty and standards of care a physician owes
his patient remain the same, despite various areas of
specialization."

2.

(R. 276 at p. 4.);

"Common to all areas of medical practice in that standard
of care is that a physician not abandon his patient in an
emergency situation until and unless a physician of equal
or superior training and ability is available to assume
that patient's care."

(Id.);
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S i m i l a r l y , the fact that appellants wish to asser t on appeal
that (1) "the claimed negligence in this case did not deal with an
issue unique to Dr Osborn's specialty" and (2) ' [a] reasonable
inference is that had D r , Osborn [as a cardiologist] personally
examined his patient rather than relying on the diagnosis of a non{continued
,)

Further, in offering case law and treatise support for their
claims, plaintiffs ignored the view that in order to establish a
breach of the standard of care by cardiologists, the plaintiffs
were required to offer the testimony of a physician in the same
specialty as the defendant. For example, although plaintiffs cited
Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care Center, 741 P.2d 969 (Utah App.
1987) , to the trial court below for the rule that an expert witness
need not testify if the matters are so widely known by the general
public, that case does not apply here as this Court can take
judicial notice of the fact that cardiology and electrophysiology
are not matters within the common purview or experience of the lay
person.
Also, although plaintiffs cited the trial court to 33 Am. Jur.
2d Proof of Facts in support of their view that

"'a general

practitioner, or a specialist in a field different
3

from the

(...continued)
cardiologist, he would have discovered the decedent's actual
condition and would have given correct advice," see plaintiffs
brief at 12-13, is not supported by any reference to the record.
This may be the belief of appellants' attorneys, but plaintiffs'
expert emergency room physician has not established that the
negligence was unrelated to Dr. Osborn's specialty or that that
emergency room physician knows what is unique to a cardiology and
electrophysiology
specialty.
Also, these two statements
demonstrate the meritless nature of plaintiffs' claims since on one
hand plaintiffs essentially argue that the treatment was not unique
to Dr. Osborn's specialty while on the other hand claim that a
cardiologist such as Dr. Osborn should not have relied upon the
diagnosis of a noncardiologist. See brief at 12-13. These facts
clearly demonstrate the impropriety of the affidavit offered and
the wisdom of the court's ruling in deciding that plaintiffs'
expert emergency room physician had not established he knew what
cardiologists and electrophysiologists should have known or done
under these circumstances.
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See also 3 Medical Malpractice U 29.02[3] (1989) ; Kronke
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App.
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Si nee plaintixrs tailed t. m e e : Lt>-* requirements

of this r u l e , summary statements in Dr. Busheell/s affidavit lacked
suf l icieiJl,, t ijiuinldLioit arid were appropriately str icken as a matter
of law.

B.

The trial court appropriately determined that the inadmissible
affidavit of plaintiffs' expert could not be salvaged because
it arguably raised questions of fact.
In entering its ruling the trial court correctly noted in part

that plaintiffs' "claim of allegations of fact being extant simply
is not supported by the record."

(R. at 287-89.)

For example,

examination of paragraph 21 of the affidavit of plaintiffs' expert
purports to claim that Dr. Osborn could have been granted courtesy
privileges had he presented himself at St. Mark's Hospital since
"in fact, a few days later, by Dr. Osborn's deposition testimony,
he did appear at St. Mark's Hospital and was permitted to check on
Ted Dikeou and review his medical records."

(R. at 235-36 1F 21.)

Nevertheless, the trial court could appropriately conclude that
statements such as this did "not state the evidence as it appears
from the record" (R. at 287-89) since the court had before it that
section

of

Dr.

Osborn's

deposition

plaintiffs

cite

unequivocally indicates:
Q:

Had you gone to the ER and looked at the strip
would you have told him "it's atrial fib and don't
give him the verapamil?

A:

I would not feel comfortable going to St. Mark's
and doing that. I did not have privileges.

Q:

Three days later you did the same thing.
to St. Mark's and looked at the chart?

A:

Correct.

Q:

You see a difference between doing that three or
four days later and doing it at the emergency room?
You see a distinction?
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You went

that

A:

Correct. My purpose in my visit was social with
the Dikeous.4

(R. at 160.)
Point III
Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Since the Plaintiffs
Themselves Verified Under Oath That a Cardiologist
Would Need to Speak to the Standard of Care Applicable
to Dr. Osborn/s Treatment and No Testimony
From a Cardiologist Was Provided
As noted in the court's own minute entry, "the record reveals
admission sufficient to support the motion for summary judgment."
(See R. at 287-89.)

Even though plaintiffs filed with the Court

their answers to defendant's interrogatories as part of plaintiffs'
exhibits in support of their opposition to defendant's motion for
summary judgment (R. at 244-51) and even though the Court's own
minute entry evidently reflected that admissions in the records
supported the granting of summary judgment, Dr. Osborn offered a
motion for filing of discovery responses with supporting memorandum
in order to further highlight the fact that in plaintiffs' answers
to defendant's interrogatoriesf plaintiffs admitted under oath that
plaintiffs believed that the interrogatory concerning the substance
of the allegations against Dr. Osborn was "best answered by a
medical expert in the field of cardiology, and in response [attach]
a

copy

of

a letter

opinion

from Michael

4

D. Lesh, M.D., a

0ther examples where the court could have concluded that
allegations of fact being extant were not supported by the record
are referenced at page 32-33, infra (R. 276 and R. 278 analysis);
and footnote No. 2, infra.
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cardiologist contacted by Plaintiff's attorney."5
(filed

by

plaintiffs)

and

R.

300-306

(See R. at 246

(redundant

filing

by

defendant).)
Not only then could the court have correctly recognized that
plaintiffs admitted below that a cardiologist was the physician
best competent and capable to speak to the standard of care
involving Dr. Osborn's involvement in this case, but even the
cardiologist plaintiffs identified in their answers to defendant's
interrogatories was unwilling to state that Dr. Osborn breached the
applicable standard of care.

(See the letter from Dr. Michael D.

Lesh sent to plaintiffs' attorney and dated July 29, 1991, R. at
312-13.) And importantly, the court had before it the record which
also demonstrated

that

only twelve days before

offering the

affidavit of an emergency room expert and after being made aware
that Dr. Osborn's motion for summary judgment had been filed (which
motion included a memorandum explicitly putting plaintiffs on
notice of defendant's view and this Court's case law that "expert
testimony in medical malpractice cases is limited to that which is
within

the

doctor's

specific

field

of

practice"

(R.

148)),

plaintiffs filed their designation of witnesses with the court
which

designation

expressly

limited

Dr. Bushnell's

testimony

regarding the standard of care to that of an "emergency room
physician."

(R. 222, quoted at factual statement No. 5, infra.)

5

For treatment of whether the court properly allowed for
supplementation of the record, see Argument, Point V, infra.
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Accordingly/ by plaintiffs' own "admissions" the trial court
could correctly rule that summary judgment was appropriate since
plaintiffs' own cardiologist drew no causal link between Dr.
Osborn's care and plaintiffs' claimed damages (R. 312-13), and
plaintiffs' emergency room physician was limited in testifying to
the standard of care of an emergency room physician (R. 222). See
Arnold, 846 P.2d at 1310-11.

This Court should not reverse this

determination since it is not clearly erroneous. Cf. Thurman, 846
P.2d at 1271 (clearly erroneous standard applies in evaluating
reliance on confession).
Issue IV
Since Plaintiffs Failed to Properly Controvert
the Facts Set Forth in Dr. Osborn/s Memorandum
in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment,
the Trial Court Correctly Concluded That Those Facts
Were Deemed Admitted and Summary Judgment
for Dr. Osborn Was Appropriate as a Matter of Law
The

rules

of

this

Court

clearly

set

forth plaintiffs'

responsibility in seeking to oppose a motion for summary judgment
and the consequences when plaintiffs fail to comply with such
rules.

See Rule

Administration.

4-501(2) (b) of the Utah Code

of Judicial

Importantly, this rule is not permissive but

states that material facts properly set forth in the movant's
statement shall be deemed admitted unless specifically controverted
as required by this rule.
In view of this rule, pages 3 through 11 of Dr. Osborn's
memorandum

in

support

paragraphs

referencing

of

his motion

specific
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facts

set

forth

and

32

sworn

numbered
testimony

supportive of Dr. Osborn's motion for summary

judgment.

In

response, howeverf plaintiffs failed to (1) offer any "concise
statement of material facts" as to which plaintiffs contend a
genuine issue exists; (2) set forth each disputed fact in separate
numbered sentences referring to appropriate portions of the record;
and

(3) specifically controvert each of the facts offered by

Dr. Osborn.

(R. 287-89; compare plaintiffs' opposition memorandum

at R. 225-26 with defendant's memorandum at R. 137-45.)

These

failures to comply with the express and unequivocal requirements of
Rule

4-501(2)(b)

mandated

that

summary

judgment

be

afforded

Dr. Osborn on the grounds and bases set forth in Dr. Osborn's
memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment.
Further, although plaintiffs cite the decision in Thomas J.
Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 515 P.2d 446, 449-50
(Utah 1973), for the principle that the "pleadings are never more
important than the cause that is before the court," that case is
inapposite since it involves tardy amendment sought to be made to
pleadings and not the standard for summary judgment. And, although
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does limit the
granting of summary judgment only "if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file together with the
affidavits if any showed that there is no genuine issue as to any
material facts and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law," this does not obviate the responsibility of
the nonmoving party to demonstrate to the court what pleadings,
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depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and
affidavits demonstrate a genuine dispute•
Indeed, the fact that plaintiffs' failure to comply with Rule
4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration is a sufficient
basis for the court's granting Dr. Osborn summary judgment in this
case is demonstrated by analogizing those rules of appellate review
that hold that a party cannot expect the court on appeal to review
the entire record for the party and glean from it the arguments
supporting a party's position. See generally State v. Tillman, 750
P. 2d

546

(Utah

1987)

(even

in

a case

involuntary manslaughter conviction

involving

appeal

of

"it is not the duty nor

prerogative of the appellate court to search the record or the
instructions to find error");

State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 41

(Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("it can hardly be maintained that an appellate court in the proper
conduct of its business can, or should, spend the time searching
for error in a case and in effect re-lawyer the entire matter from
the ground up"); State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah App.),
cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (1992) ("the purpose of the marshalling
requirement is to spare appellate courts the onerous burden of
combing through the record in search of supporting factual matters"
(cited case omitted)).
In short, as this Court has previously held, "we will not
interfere with the trial court's case management unless its actions
amount to an abuse of discretion." Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande.
830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (1992).
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Certainly Judge Moffat's decision to grant Dr. Osborn summary
judgment in part because of plaintiffs' failure to comply with Rule
4-501 was a discretionary case management decision which was not
abused.
Point V
This Court Should Not Consider Plaintiffs' Claims
(Regarding the Court Ordering Additional Materials
in the Record) When Plaintiffs Did Not Raise This Issue
in Their Docketing Statement on Appeal
The Utah appellate courts have long upheld the rule that they
will generally refuse to consider issues not presented to the trial
court below, even if the issues arguably involve only legal
questions.

See Zions First National Bank v. National American

Title Insurance, 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988) (and cases cited
therein).
For example, in Allisen v. American Legion Post 134, 763 P.2d
806 (Utah 1988) , the Utah Supreme Court concluded that it would not
consider a theory of recovery raised on appeal where a different
theory was alleged under the complaint and the trial court had
limited

its

complaint.

ruling to the theory

raised

in the plaintiff s

See id. at 807-809.

Similarly, this Court has

heretofore considered the inefficacy and inappropriateness of a
petitioner raising issues for the first time in a petition for
rehearing. State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1112 (Utah App. 1990),
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (1991).
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Certainly this correct principle of law should likewise apply
in cases where the appellant seeks to brief an argument not set
forth in his or her docketing statement.
Here, in plaintiffs7 docketing statement the sole issues for
review were stated:
a.
Did the trial court err in rejecting, on a
motion for summary
judgment, an emergency room
physician's testimony that the defendant cardiologist had
a duty to go to the emergency room, if necessary, to make
a proper diagnosis, rather than relying on the erroneous
diagnosis of a non-cardiologist emergency room physician?
The sufficiency of the affidavit to defeat a motion for
summary judgment is a question of law and is reviewed for
correctness. Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101-02
(Utah 1992).
b.
Did the trial court err in concluding there
were no disputed issues of material fact, where
defendant's assertion of no negligence was based on
defendant's testimony that he could not have treated the
decedent at a hospital where he did not have staff
privileges, whereas plaintiffs presented evidence that
defendant could have rendered treatment notwithstanding
the lack of staff privileges? This question of law is
reviewed for correctness. Id*
(See appellate record.)

Based upon these issues set forth in the

docketing statement, then, and absent any showing of good cause to
the contrary, plaintiffs' claim in their brief that the trial court
incorrectly considered additional information prior to entering its
final judgment and order could appropriately be overlooked by this
Court.

See generally Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432,

437 (Utah App. 1991) ("Appellants did not mention this issue in the
docketing statement nor in their main brief. The claimed error was
not timely specified at the trial court, so it could be considered
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there, nor was it timely specified on appeal pursuant to Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure 9, 11 and 24.")
As Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governing
docketing statements in part dictates, "The docketing statement
shall contain the following information
presented by the appeal."

. . . (5) the issues

Accordingly, based upon appellants7

failure to set forth in their docketing statement the issue they
now seek to brief on appeal, this Court should not consider whether
or not the trial court appropriately allowed the record to be
supplemented after entering its minute entry below.
Point VI
Even If This Court Chooses to Analyze Plaintiffs'
Argument Not Raised in Their Docketing Statement
(Concerning Additional Information the Court Ordered
Placed in the Record), the Trial Court Did Hot Abuse
Its Discretion and the Decision
Was at Worst Harmless Error
As the above factual statement indicates on May 8, 1992,
Dr. Osborn filed a motion for filing of discovery responses with
supporting memorandum and exhibits. Therein, Dr. Osborn moved the
court

to

order

that

plaintiffs7

answers

to

Dr.

Osborn7s

interrogatories and answers to defendant St. Mark's Hospital's
first set of interrogatories be filed as part of the record in this
case. See R. 297. Importantly, this motion was redundant insofar
as

plaintiffs7

concerned

answers

to

Dr. Osborn7s

interrogatories

were

since plaintiffs themselves had already filed those

interrogatory

answers with the court as an exhibit to their
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memorandum
judgment.

in opposition to Dr. Osborn's motion

for

summary

See R. 246.

Plaintiffs complain that the court erred in granting this
motion for filing of discovery responses since plaintiffs did not
have sufficient opportunity to respond thereto and since the
matters were not properly a part of the record or the court's
consideration.

These arguments are erroneous for the following

reasons.
First, as page 246 of the record

indicates, plaintiffs

themselves filed with the court their answers to Dr. Osborn's
interrogatories including their answer to Interrogatory No. 2
wherein they state under oath that they believe the allegations
against Dr. Osborn are "best answered by a medical expert in the
field of cardiology." Accordingly, when Dr. Osborn moved the court
to allow it to file another copy of those discovery requests, it
was appropriate for the court in its discretion to authorize this
request since essentially the same information was already in the
record.

By filing the answers themselves plaintiffs waived any

objection thereto and cannot credibly claim they were prejudiced by
the lack of any opportunity to brief the supplementation issue.
Second, as the court's own minute entry indicates at the time
it entered summary judgment it was "fully advised in the premises"
and thus it must be presumed that the court considered the entire
record including plaintiffs' opposition memorandum and exhibits
thereto which included the very interrogatory answers Dr. Osborn
sought to refile.
45

Third, although plaintiffs claim that they did not have an
opportunity to respond to the motion to file discovery responses
until after the court ruled on the same, plaintiffs ignore the fact
that they did not file their opposition timely under Rule 4-501 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration

in any event since

(without leave of court) it was filed approximately 14 days after
the court entered its order and some 21 days after having received
Dr. Osborn's motion to supplement the record.
Fourth,

the

cases

plaintiffs

cite

See R. 346-49.

in

support

of

their

proposition that the court erred in granting this motion are
inapposite and do not apply in this case.

Indeed, none of the

cases involve facts similar to this case and those that hold that
the court should consider only the record at the time the judgment
was entered involve appellate court standards of review.

See,

e.g., Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta, 640 P.2d 764, 771 (Utah
1982); Moore v. Pacific Northwest Bell, 662 P.2d 398, 403 (Wash.
App. 1983); and the one Utah case cited involves Rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for supplementing the appellate
record when necessary, which rule is not applicable here as
defendant never sought to supplement the appellate record.

See

Olson v. Park Craig Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah App.
1991).6
6

If appellants evidently wish to argue that Judge Moffat's
decision to grant defendant's order to file answers to
interrogatories in the record was a post-judgment ruling, this is
not the case since judgment was not entered until the same day the
court ordered the record supplemented. See R. 339 and 342.
46

In contrast, the Utah Supreme Court in Franklin Financial v.
New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d

1040, 1045

(Utah 1983),

indicated that all that needs to essentially be shown is that
matters were timely presented to the trial court sufficient to
obtain a ruling thereon and that "the burden is on the parties to
make certain that the record they compile will adequately preserve
their arguments for review in the event of an appeal." Under this
standard, Dr. Osborn's motion to file answers to plaintiffs7
interrogatories was timely submitted and met Dr. Osborn's burden to
make certain the record would adequately preserve his arguments for
appeal.
In

sum,

before

summary

judgment

was

entered

plaintiffs

voluntarily submitted information in their sworn statements that
their allegations against Dr. Osborn were best supported by a
cardiologist. Also, plaintiffs had served defendant with a letter
from that cardiologist (that defendant wanted filed), see R. 31213, which was not even critical of Dr. Osborn and demonstrated
plaintiffs' inability to meet their burden of proof concerning a
breach of the applicable standard of care proximately causing
plaintiffs' claimed injuries.
hoped the court would

Thereafter, plaintiffs evidently

ignore the fact that their own sworn

admission established that summary judgment was appropriate in this
case.

This, however, the court evidently did not do.

Instead,

before Dr. Osborn's counsel ever moved the court to file answers to
interrogatories, the court on April 17, 1992, in its signed minute
entry indicated that summary judgment was appropriate among other
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reasons since "the record reveals admissions sufficient to support
the motion for summary judgment." See R. 289. Based upon the fact
that plaintiffs can demonstrate no prejudice by the court granting
Dr. Osborn's motion to file additional matters in the record,
appellants' argument in this respect is without merit and the
court's decision was at worst harmless error.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in this
case since plaintiffs failed to present evidence of a competent and
credible expert familiar with Dr. Osborn's specialty that Dr.
Osborn breached the applicable standard of care proximately causing
plaintiffs' claimed injuries.

Further, the trial court correctly

ordered stricken the affidavit of plaintiffs' emergency room expert
since it lacked foundation and was based upon speculation, hearsay
and did not correctly state evidence from the record.
Finally, the court correctly ruled that summary judgment was
appropriate in this case given the Dikeous' failure to comply with
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and based
upon their own admissions in the record as to their inability to
meet their burden of proof.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ T

day of

1993.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

Jaryl L. Rencher
Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellee Dr. Osborn
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